I worked out a new voting system that,
combining the good points of paper voting with those of computing,
guarantees quick, honest and verifiable results.
Please read details at
www.ClearVoting.com

ACCESSIBILITYa

electronic voting and Democracy

traduci in italiano

Faq

none previous chapter. Accesskey=1 none next chapter. Accesskey=2
logo of the site

electronic voting and Democracy

Faq

 

who is interested in counterfeiting elections?

For elections, the principal asset is governmental power. That power is transferred by the results of counting voted secret ballots. Hence, integrity of the voted ballot is critical through the entire process from capturing the voter's intent, casting it into the ballot box, counting it to produce the election results, and finally retaining it to resolve disputes.

Given that the primary asset of an election is governmental power, it must be assumed that attackers are highly motivated, well financed, sophisticated, and could be outsiders as well as insiders with full knowledge of the election system. These attackers could be political operatives, voters, vendor personnel, polling place workers, election administrators, foreign countries, international terrorist organizations, or just pranksters.

Sitting governments must guarantee the accuracy of electoral results and the secrecy of votes. Unfortunately the social groups & the economical powers which are the base of any government have the obvious interest in falsifying electoral results and violating the secrecy of votes to mantain the power. They could also succeed thanks to the complete control they have over the electoral process. For that reason it is absolutely necessary that electoral procedures guarantee also against hidden attacks coming from the inside of the sitting administrations.

It is assumed that the most virulent attacker is extremely motivated, sophisticated and well financed, thus it is assumed that insiders are not trusted since the attacker could compromise them as well. In fact attacks could also be mounted from the incumbent government.

The principal vulnerabilities to the voted secret ballot are
  1. undetected compromise of election integrity
  2. compromise of ballot secrecy
  3. denial of voting service.

An undetected compromise of election integrity is the most horrific vulnerability because it results in an unwarranted change of political power. In contrast, a detectable compromise reduces to a denial-of-service attack against the system. For example, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks occurred on Election Day in New York. Because many voters were denied the mechanism of voting, the election was disqualified and postponed. However, the principal asset (i.e., governmental power) was not erroneously transferred and, thereby, not compromised.

Electronic elections can easily be couterfeit by:

  1. Those who are in charge of the election, that is those who physically have the "keys" of the computers. Such persons could do anything to the data and the programs in these computers. Probably the expiring Cabinet or a big national or international Company debtor to the expiring Cabinet for allocation of contracts.
  2. Large organizations. As computers must of course be networked to one another and to the polling stations , it's possible to enter via the net and alter the memorized data and programs.. Kids of 14 entered computers of the Pentagon and also altered data kept in other extremely protected sites. How can we deceive ourselves thinking that political, criminal, terrorist, or economic organizations vill not do the same, having adequate financial means? Criminal organizations are designing, producing and selling decoders for video satellite signals that have been cripted with technologies quite similar to those used for the transmission of the election data. What would prevent them from knowing who voted whom, or from counterfeiting the results in order to elect their own representatives in the democratic institution?
  3. International spy intelligence. International spy intelligence (e.g. Echelon) have the know-how and the power to read and to alter any piece of information going through any network all over the world. Are you sure they will not be activated in order to counterfeit the polical balance of other Countries?
Of course small criminal groups will not able to modify or detect votes, nevertheless they would go on threatening, frightning and promissing before the election, just like they do now. But they would heavely interfere if people could vote in places not under the control of the public, like houses.

Nowadays we face terrorism as one of the most dangerous attack to our Democracies. Since in Democracy the political power is given to politicians by means of elections, a good goal for terrorists could be the alteration of electoral processes. If they could delegitimate the ruling power, they would have a great victory against democracies!
Ballot paper elections are very robust and have no single point of failure: there is NOT a single place which abnormal functioning could lead to the impossibility to declare the winner. Paper elections can be held despite of black outs and interruptions of computer networks. Infact paper elections have properly worked also when electricity and computer did not even exist!
On the contrary, electronic elections are based on computer networks and computer centers which are very good targets for terrorists. A terrorist attack to the network infrastucture, to power distribution lines, or to a computer center could lead to the impossibility to know who is the winner of the election. It would deny governments any democratic legitimation, seriously harming any Democracy
Thus the existence of terrorism is a very good reason to elect our Parliaments and Governments using ballot papers!


 
The site is made of several chapters. You can change chapter clicking on the arrows or pressing the access keys 1 and 2. Some chapters are made of several documents. You can change document clicking on the arrows or pressing the access keys 3 and 4. Access keys are described in the Accessibility page. Site Map is in this Site Map page.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Licence. You are free to copy, distribute, display and perform the work and to make derivative works under the following conditions: 1) You must give credit to the original author (Emanuele Lombardi) and cite the url http://www.electronic-vote.org ; 2) you may not use this work for commercial purposes; 3) If you alter, transform, or build upon this work, you may distribute the resulting work only under a licence identical to this one.


This site uses valid XHTML 1.0!__ This site uses valid CSS__ Dublin Core Metadata Initiative__ Creative Commons License
This page complies with W3C WCAG P3 but accessibility is a very difficult matter: if you find the site not easily accessible, please let me know