I worked out a new voting system that,
combining the good points of paper voting with those of computing,
guarantees quick, honest and verifiable results.
Please read details at
www.ClearVoting.com
a
|
electronic voting and Democracy
|
|
electronic voting and Democracy
Details
differences between votes and financial data
Our world if so full of computers and electronic devices that it comes natural for us to think they
might be used for elections too. After all, isn't voting a mere transaction by which we simply add 1 to the electoral
"balance" of our candidate, just the way we add money to someone's bank balance when we use our credit card?
Unfortunately votes and economical data largely differ in the level
of the secrecy they require thus we can't use the same techniques to process both. In fact:
- financial data can be kept secret to people not involved with them,
but are well known to payers, intermediaries, and payees.
Financial data are in someone's name:
when we pay by check, bank card or credit card, accounts are generated
(receipts, debits, credits, orders) in which our name (or our code number)
is specified along with the amount paid. Specifically because economic transactions are
in someone's name, they can be verified and checked.
Receipts can be given to payers so that they can verify their own account.
- votes must be secret from everybody since
democracy requires absolute vote secrecy.
Each vote must be known only to his own voter (the payer) and unknown to all the others,
particularly to the electoral service (the intermediaries) and candidates (the payees).
Electors can't be given any "receipt" stating how they voted since:
- people could be encouraged to sell their own vote because they could demonstrate whom they actually
voted for.
- such a "receipt", whichever media could be made of, could be used as an illicit way to know
people's electoral preferences: not only employers could discriminate among employees according to what they
voted for, but gangsters could verify if people really voted as ordered!
We can't permit electors any verification of the vote stored in their behalf
for the following reasons:
- a link between each vote and its elector should be stored somehow somewhere and this is
obviously dangerous for vote secrecy.
- even if we could find a safe way to allow voters to verify the vote stored in their behalf,
we couldn't trust their verification since they might be under illicit pressure to confirm or deny such vote,
they might have changed their mind, or they might simply wish to mess election up!
In any case, the verification that a vote has properly been stored doesn't imply it has also
properly been counted up.
There is another difference between financial data and votes: the balance of our account
depends only on our transactions, while the "balance" of the election (who wins) depends on the votes
of millions other people, thus checking and verifying only our vote don't help much. We can say that financial
transactions are 1:1 relationships while electoral transactions are 1:N
relationships.
The site is made of several .
You can change clicking on the
or pressing the access keys
1
and
2.
Some chapters are made of several .
You can change clicking on the
or pressing the access keys
3
and
4.
Access keys are described in the
Accessibility page.
Site Map is in this
Site Map page.
This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Licence.
You are free to copy, distribute, display and perform the work and to make derivative works
under the following conditions: 1) You must give credit to the original author (Emanuele Lombardi)
and cite the url http://www.electronic-vote.org ;
2) you may not use this work for commercial purposes;
3) If you alter, transform, or build upon this work, you may distribute the resulting work only under a
licence identical to this one.

__

__

__
This page complies with
W3C WCAG P3 but accessibility is a very difficult matter: if you find the site not easily accessible, please let me know